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TREATIES: FISHING RIGHTS IN THE PACIFIC
NORTHWEST-THE SUPREME COURT
"LEGISLATES" AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION
Rod Vessels*
In 1970 the United States, on its own behalf and as trustee for
seven Pacific Northwest Indian tribes,' brought suit in federal
district court against the state of Washington. 2 The government
alleged Washington state's statutory and regulatory scheme for
managing its fisheries was interfering with the fishing rights of
the tribes. At issue was the interpretation of the tribal treaties
securing to the Indians a "right of taking fish ... in common
with all citizens of the Territory."
3
The district court held that the treaties entitled the tribes to
approximately 50 percent' of the harvestable fish passing
through recognized tribal fishing grounds in the case area.' The
Ninth Circuit affirmed, 6 and the Supreme Court denied
*Third Place Winner, 1980 Indian Law Writing Competition. B.A. 1973, Minnesota,
Summa Cum Laude; J.D. 1980, Brigham Young.
1. Additional tribes eventually became involved in this and the other cases con-
solidated for review in the instant case. The parties ultimately included the following
tribes: Hoh; Lower Elwha Band of Clallam Indians; Lummi; Makah; Muckleshoot; Nis-
qually; Nooksack; Port Gamble Band of Clallam Indians; Puyallup; Quileute; Quinault;
Sauk-Suiattle; Skokomish; Sqaxin Island; Stillaguamish; Suquamish; Swinomish; Tulalip;
Upper Skagit; the Yakima Nation.
2. Washington v. Washington State Comm'l Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 657 (1979).
3. See Treaty of Medicine Creek, art. 3, 10 Stat. 1132 (1854) (emphasis added).
4. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd,
520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). The district court deci-
sion was framed in terms of an "opportunity to take up to 50% of the harvestable
number of fish." 384 F. Supp. at 343 (emphasis added). Fish taken by the Indians on
their reservations were not counted against their share. Id. The district court also exclud-
ed from the treaty share those fish caught for ceremonial and subsistence purposes. Id.
5. The "case area" was defined by the district court as "that portion of the State of
Washington west of the Cascade Mountains and north of the Columbia River drainage
area, and includes the American portion of the Puget Sound watershed, the watersheds of
the Olympic Peninsula north of the Grays Harbor watershed, and the offshore waters ad-
jacent to those areas." 384 F. Supp. at 328.
6. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1086 (1976). In a separate opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that an agreement between
Canada and the United States, which was secured by regulations formulated by the Inter-
national Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission, did not preempt the Indian tribes' entitle-
ment to 50 percent of the American harvest of fish runs subject to the United States-
Canada agreement. United States v. Washington, 573 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1978). This rul-
ing was upheld in the instant case and is not further discussed in this Note. See
Washington v. Washington State Comm'l Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 657,
696 (1979).
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certiorari.7 The district court subsequently ordered Washington
state's Department of Fisheries to adopt regulations implement-
ing the judicially affirmed treaty rights.8 New regulations were
adopted but were immediately challenged by private citizens in
suits commenced in Washington state courts.9
Two such cases reached the Washington Supreme Court,1°
which interpreted the treaties as granting to the tribes merely a
right to compete with nontreaty fishermen on an individual
basis." The state's highest court held that the district court's
recognition of special allocation rights for treaty Indians violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 It
further held that Washington's Fisheries Department lacked
authority to adopt enforcement regulations in compliance with
the district court's order protecting the treaty rights."
In response to these decisions, the federal district court entered
a series of orders enabling it, with the aid of federal law enforce-
ment agencies, to supervise the state's fisheries directly to
preserve the treaty fishing rights.' " The district court's power to
take such action was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
federal and state cases, 16 which were consolidated for review. In
7. United States v. Washington, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
8. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 416-17 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
9. See Washington State Comm' Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 89
Wash. 2d 276, 571 P.2d 1373 (1977); Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wash.
2d 677, 565 P.2d 1151 (1977).
10. Id. (both cases).
11. The court stubbornly said, "Being cited no authority for the proposition that
federal district courts have exclusive jurisdictional [sic] to construe Indian treaties-
treaties which affect important interests of the state-we adhere to our own interpretation
of the treaty." Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wash. 2d at 679, 565 P.2d at
1158.
12. "[ihe granting of more than 50 percent of the harvestable fish to .028 percent
of the population (treaty Indians) and less than 50 percent to 2,243,069 non-Indian
population, violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution." Washington State Comm'I Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n
v. Tollefson, 89 Wash. 2d 276, 285-86, 571 P.2d 1373, 1378 (1977).
13. This holding was a principal reason why the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
the instant case. See Washington v. Washington State Comm'l Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 674 (1979).
14. United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
15. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States District Court, 573 F.2d 1123
(9th Cir. 1978).
16. The cases consolidated for review were Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United
States District Court, 573 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Washington, 573
F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1978); Washington State Comm'l Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss1/7
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Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Association,'" the Supreme Court, With three Justices
dissenting, affirmed in pertinent part the district court's inter-
pretation of the treaty fishing rights'" and vacated the
Washington Supreme Court decisions.' 9 The Court found that
the treaty language secured to the Indian tribes the fight to
harvest up to 50 percent of each run of fish that passed through
tribal fishing areas, rather than merely a right to compete with
nontreaty fishermen on an individual basis.2" The Court,
however, left the door open to future modifications; exact alloca-
tions to the tribes could be reduced if tribal needs could be
satisfied by a lesser amount.2'
Finally, the Court held that the state regulations prohibiting
compliance with the district court's orders could not survive the
mandate of the supremacy clause;22 hence, Washington's
Fisheries Department could be ordered to adopt regulations im-
plementing the district court's interpretation of the treaty fishing
rights.23
I. Background
A. The Subject of Litigation: Anadromous Fish
The contested resource in the instant case was anadromous
fish; that is, salmon and trout that spend successive portions of
their life cycles in fresh, then salt, and finally fresh water.2" Five
species of salmon-chinook, coho, chum, pink, and sock-
eye-and one species of trout-steelhead-comprise the resource
over which the state of Washington and treaty and nontreaty
fishermen have fought so fervently in the last decade.25
Tollefson, 89 Wash. 2d 276, 571 P.2d 1373 (1977); and Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v.
Moos, 88 Wash. 2d 677, 565 P.2d 1151 (1977).
17. 443 U.S. 657 (1979).
18. Id. at 685-86. See note 97 and accompanying text infra.
19. 443 U.S. at 696.
20. Id. at 685.
21. Id. at 685-86.
22. U.S. CONST. art. 6, § 2.
23. 443 U.S. at 695.
24. The fish hatch in fresh water, migrate to the ocean where they reach maturity,
and return eventually to fresh water to spawn. Brief for Petitioners, Washington State, at
15, Washington v. Washington State Comm'l Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
657 (1979).
25. Brief for Petitioners, Washington State, at 16, id.
19801
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These fish are caught or "harvested" 26 at a rate of approx-
imately eight million fish a year.27 The annual value of the har-
vested salmon resource in the Puget Sound alone approaches $50
million.2" More than 6,600 nontreaty fishermen and about 800
treaty Indians made their livelihood by commercial fishing in'
Washirigton state.2 9 In addition, more than 280,000 individuals
are licensed for sport fishing in the state.30
For centuries, the treaty tribes have depended on anadromous
fish for their livelihood, subsistence, and religious customs.3 ,
Because the migrating fish are not confined to inland lakes or
other restricted areas, the tribes argue that without special allot-
ment protection, their fishery resource will be depleted before
reaching the treaty fishing sites.12 While regulation of the
anadromous fisheries in the Pacific Northwest is complicated by
the migrating habits of the fish, the principal confusion has in-
volved the treaties reserving the tribal fishing rights and the ques-
tion of how to interpret those rights.
B. The Tribal Treaties
To secure land for settlement in what is now the state of
Washington, the United States in 1854 and 1855 entered into six
treaties33 with the various Pacific Northwest Indian tribes. The
26. As the term "harvest" suggests, the management of anadromous fisheries in the
state of Washington is similar in many respects to the cultivation of crops. The
"harvestable" number of fish is the number that can be caught within conservation
limits. See 443 U.S. at 663.
27. Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari, Washington State, at 6, Washington v.
Washington State Comm'l Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 657 (1979).
28. Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari, Washington State, at 7, id.
29. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 387 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd,
520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
30. 443 U.S. 657, 664 n.4 (1979). "Although in terms of the number and weight of
fish involved, the commercial salmon catch is far more substantial than the recreational
steelhead catch, the latter provides the State with more revenue, involves more people,
and accordingly has been a more controversial political issue within the State." Id.
31. Brief for Respondents, United States, at 60, Washington v. Washington State
Comm'l Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 657 (1979).
32. Brief for Respondents, United States, at 62. Opponents consider this argument
to be academic, because the tribes' "usual and accustomed" fishing grounds "include vir-
tually every body of water in Washington State except some small lakes." Reply Brief for
Petitioners, Washington State, at 2, Washington v. Washington State Comm'l Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 657 (1979).
33. The six treaties are: Treaty with the Quinaults (Treaty of Olympia), 12 Stat. 971
(1855); Treaty with the Yakimas, 12 Stat. 951 (1855); Treaty with the Makahs (Treaty of
Neah Bay), 12 Stat. 939 (1855); Treaty of Point No Point, 12 Stat. 933 (1855); Treaty of
Point Elliot, 12 Stat. 927 (1855); and Treaty of Medicine Creek, 10 Stat. 1132 (1854).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss1/7
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tribes held large tracts of land, stretching along the many rivers
and streams of the Washington Territory to the Puget Sound.34
The Indian population at this time had diminished to less than
8 , 0 0 0 .31 White settlers, numbering no more than 2,000,36 depend-
ed on the more expert Indians to supply them with salmon and
trout.37
In exchange for ceding their land to the United States, the
tribes received monetary payments, small parcels of land for their
exclusive use, and other guarantees, including the protection of
their tribal fishing practices on the reservations.38 In addition,
each of the six treaties contains a provision securing off-
reservation fishing rights. The following is typical:
The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds
and stations, is further secured to said Indians, in common
with all citizens of the Territory, and of erecting temporary
houses for the purpose of curing together with the privilege of
hunting, gathering roots and berries . . . on open and un-
claimed lands. .. .
Four different interpretations of the "in common with" treaty
language have been advanced over the last several years of litiga-
tion: (1) the treaties guarantee to the tribes only a right of access
over private lands to usual and accustomed tribal fishing
grounds; they require no allocation to the Indians of a specified
share of the runs passing through the traditional tribal fishing
areas;40 (2) the treaties secure to the tribes either a 50 percent
share of the harvestable fish that pass through their fishing
places, or the amount that fulfills their reasonable needs,
whichever is less;4" (3) the treaties reserve to the tribes a preex-
isting right to as many fish as commercial and subsistence needs
dictate, even exceeding half the harvestable resource if
necessary;42 and (4) the tribes are entitled to a specific percentage
of the harvestable fish, regardless of need. 3
34. Brief for Respondents, United States, at 55, 443 U.S. 657 (1979).
35. Id.; Brief for Petitioners, Washington State, 28.
36. 443 U.S. at 664.
37. Brief for Respondents, United States, at 55, id.
38. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
39. Treaty of Medicine Creek, art. 3, 10 Stat. 1132, 1133 (1854) (emphasis added).
40. The Game Department took this position. 443 U.S. at 657-58.
41. The United States took this position. See Brief for Respondents, United States,
at 70, id.
42. This has been the argument of the Indian tribes. See 443 U.S. 657-58 (1979).
43. Id. Washington state's Department of Fisheries proposed that the Indians be en-
titled to a strict one-third share of the fish.
1980]
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Resolving this treaty interpretation conflict requires looking to
the historical setting of the treaty negotiations. Contemporaneous
writings, treaty minutes, and other available information strongly
indicate the original intent of the government was to provide the
Indians merely with the right of access to their traditional fishing
grounds.
While negotiating the treaties with the tribes, Isaac Stevens,
governor of the Washington Territory, clarified in a letter to his
superiors the intent of the government's offer to the Indians:
"They would have the right of travelling throughout the country
for lawful business; fishing at accustomed places in common with
the whites. And going to the mountains for berries. . . .",'
This understanding-that the parties were bargaining for the
right of common access to the fishery-was also reflected in a
report by George Gibbs, frequently referred to as the "author"
of the treaties: "[T]hey [the Indians] require the liberty of motion
for the purpose of seeking, in their proper season, roots, berries,
and fish, where those articles can be found." 45
On more than one occasion, the tribes were informed they were
bargaining for a right of access to the then abundant fish
resource. Governor Stevens, in his negotiations at the Treaty of
Point Elliot on Monday, January 22, 1855, stated:
We want to place you in homes where you can cultivate the
soil, using potatoes and other articles of food, and where you
will be able to pass in canoes over the waters of the Sound and
catch fish and back to the mountains to get roots and berries."
On a second occasion, an agent of the United States explained to
the Indians that if they would relinquish all but small reserves of
their lands, "the privilege was given of going wherever else they
pleased to fish and work for the whites." '47
On the other hand, there is evidence that the intent of the In-
dians at the treaty negotiations may not have been rooted solely
in obtaining a right of access but in securing a permanent food
resource for the tribes. One-lun-teh-tat, a Skokomish Indian
spokesman at the treaty negotiations, said:
I wish to speak my mind as to selling the land-Great Chief.
What shall we eat if we do so? Our only food is berries, deer
44. See Brief for Petitioners, Washington State, at 46, id.






and salmon. Where then shall we find these? I don't want to
sign away all my land. Take half of it and let us keep the rest. I
am afraid that I shall become destitute and perish for want of
food. 8
Proponents of the guaranteed-share interpretation of the treaties
argue that this interpretation carries out the representation made
by Governor Stevens to the Indians when he said, "This paper
[treaty] secures your fish." ' 49
Although a study of the contemporaneous written and oral
representations made during treaty negotiations is helpful,
understanding the true intent of the treaties is complicated by the
fact that communication between the parties was obstructed by
both language and cultural barriers. The vast majority of Indians
at the treaty councils did not speak or understand English. The
treaty provisions were written in English; clauses often were
drafted before any formal meeting at a treaty ground. 50 At the
negotiations, the treaty provisions and the remarks of the
negotiators were interpreted in Chinook jargon. 5' Unfortunately,
many of the Indians themselves could not understand Chinook
jargon; therefore, the jargon was translated into native language
by Indian interpreters.52
Chinook jargon provided a simple 300-word commercial
vocabulary that did not include words corresponding to many of
the treaty terms. 53 For example, there were no words for "com-
mon," "usual," "accustomed," "citizens," "steelhead," and
other phrases, many of which have become controversial in the
interpretation of the treaties.5 4
Despite the language limitations, the treaty negotiations ap-
parently were viewed as a success by the parties. Although the
tribes had given up almost all the land that they had aboriginally
possessed, they assumed that they had received a fair bargain. On
January 31, 1855, at the close of the treaty negotiations, Gover-
nor Stevens met with the chiefs and headmen of the Makah Tribe
at Neah Bay. The signing ceremony is recorded as follows:
48. Id. at 32.
49. Brief for Respondents, United States, at 56 (emphasis added), id.
50. See Brief for Respondents, Indian Tribes, at 17, id.
51. Id.
52. Brief for Petitioners, Washington State, at 34, id.
53. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 330 (W.D. Wash. 1974),
affd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
54. Brief for Respondents, Indian Tribes, at 17, 443 U.S. 657 (1979).
1980]
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Tse-Kaw-Wootl (a chief of the Majoahs) brought up a white
flag and presented it saying, "look at this flag, see if there are
any spots on it. There are none, and there are none on our
hearts." Kalchote (another chief) presented another flag.
"What you have said was good, and what you have written is
good." The Indians gave three cheers or shouts as each con-
cluded. The Governor then signed the treaty, and was followed
by the Indian chiefs and principal men."
The presentation of white flags by the tribes symbolized their
feeling that the United States had dealt fairly with them and that
their right to fish, the nucleus of their culture, had been preserved.
The responsibility was then left to the courts to interpret how the
treaties were intended to secure this right.
C. The Applicable Cases
Four cases litigated in the state of Washington and ultimately
decided in the United States Supreme Court have confronted the
treaty language involved in the instant case. These cases have pro-
vided some ammunition for both sides concerning whether the
treaties secure to the Indians merely access and an equal oppor-
tunity with others to fish, or whether the treaties guarantee a
specific share of the fish to the tribes.
1. United States v. Winans
In United States v. Winans," the United States brought suit on
behalf of the Yakima Nation to enjoin nontreaty fishermen from
obstruction of the tribe's treaty fishing rights on the Columbia
River in Washington state." The nontreaty fishermen had obtained
title claims under United States patents to lands bordering on the
Columbia River. They also had obtained licenses from the state
to maintain devices for taking fish called "fish wheels." 8
The United States Supreme Court rejected the lower court's
finding that the 1855 treaty gave no additional fishing rights to
the tribes than it gave to any other state inhabitant. The Court
considered such a view "an impotent outcome to negotiations
and a convention, which seemed to promise more and give the
55. See id. at 5-6.
56. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
57. Id. at 379.
58. Id. Fishing wheels (also called salmon wheels) are devices rotated by the water




word of the Nation for more." 59 Stressing that the tribe's treaty
right to fish was as "necessary to the existence of the Indians [as]
the atmosphere they breathed, ' 6 the Court found that the
Yakima Treaty secured to the tribe "a right in the land-the right
of crossing it to the river-the right to occupy it to the extent and
for the purpose mentioned." ' 6' In other words, the treaty "fixes
in the land such easements as enables the right [of access] to be
exercised." ' 62 Because the nontreaty fishermen's use of the fish
wheels gave them in effect "exclusive possession of the fishing
places, '" 63 they were enjoined from using the fish wheels until an
"adjustment and accommodation ' "' 6 between the treaty and non-
treaty fishermen could be effected.
Relying on the Court's instructions in Winans calling for an
"adjustment and accommodation," advocates for the tribes in
the instant case argued that Winans requires more than mere
right of access-that the anadromous fishery should be fairly ap-
portioned between treaty and nontreaty fishermen.65 Washington
state disagreed, reasoning that the relevant point in Winans was
the exclusive possession of the space occupied by the fish wheels,
which interfered with the Indians' treaty right of access to the
fishery.
A closer look at the Winans decision reveals that the latter in-
terpretation is more accurate. When the Court spoke of an "ad-
justment and accommodation," it was referring to a suggestion
made by the Solicitor General in the United States' Brief.66 The
"adjustment and accommodation" discussed in the government's
brief, and referred to in Winans, was in the context of arguing
the right of access to the trapped fish in the fish wheels, rather
than apportionment of equal shares. The Solicitor General
argued:
A decree for appellants [the Indians] must consider the
reasonable rights of both parties; restricting the fish wheels if
they can be maintained at all, as to their number, method and
59. Id. at 380.
60. Id. at 381.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 384.
63. Id. at 382.
64. Id. at 384.
65. See, e.g. Brief for Respondents, United States, at 61; Brief for Respondents, In-
dian Tribes, at 15, 443 U.S. 657 (1979).
66. See 198 U.S. 381, 384 (1905).
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daily hours of operation. Nor can the Indians claim an ex-
clusive right, and it may be just to restrict them in reasonable
ways as to times and modes of access to the property and their
hours for fishing. But by some proper route, following the old
trails, and at proper hours, with due protection for the defen-
dants' buildings, stock and crops, free ingress to and egress
from thefishing grounds should be open to the Indians, and be
kept open.67
While the Winans decision, therefore, speaks in terms of an
"accommodation and adjustment," the case viewed in toto seems
to support the treaty interpretation that the tribes were
guaranteed access to their usual and accustomed fishing grounds,
rather than an equal share of the harvestable fish. 68
2. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game (Puyallup I)
More than sixty years after Winans, the Supreme Court was
again faced with adjudicating fishing rights involving one of the
1855 treaties. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game (Puyallup
V)69 involved the construction of the Treaty of Medicine Creek
made with the Puyallup and Nisqually Indians. 7° The principal
issue was the constitutionality of certain conservation measures
adopted by the state of Washington that allegedly impinged the
tribes' treaty fishing rights.
The Puyallup and Nisqually Indians were using set nets to
harvest fish in their respective off-reservation fishing grounds.
The nets were illegal under the conservation laws adopted by the
state. The Supreme Court held that "the manner of fishing, the
size of the take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and the like
may be regulated by the State in the interest of conservation, pro-
vided the regulation meets appropriate standards and does not
discriminate against the Indians."'
The Court found, however, that the lower court's decision had
not clearly resolved the question of whether barring the use of set
nets and allowing only hook and line fishing was a reasonable
and necessary conservation measure; therefore, the case was
remanded for determination of that question.72
67. Brief for Appellants, United States, at 54-55, 443 U.S. 657 (1979); United States
v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) (emphasis added).
68. See notes 56-67 and accompanying text supra.
69. 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
70. 10 Stat. 1132 (1854).
71. 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968). Accord, Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942).




The importance of Puyallup I, in terms of the controversy in
the instant case, is that the Court described the treaty fishing
right as the "right to fish 'at all usual and accustomed' places." '73
The emphasis, therefore, was on access, rather than a right to an
equal percentage of the fish. Once again, however, the Court pro-
vided some language that could be used by later proponents of
the equal share theory. In remanding the case for resolution of
the conservation issue, the Court instructed that "the issue of
equal protection implicit in the phrase 'in common with"' would
also have to be addressed.74 In subsequent cases, the tribes would
argue that "equal protection" mandates an equal division of the
fishery resource.7"
3. Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II)
After the remand in Puyallup I, the Washington Supreme
Court upheld the Department of Game's total prohibition of net
fishing for steelhead trout. In Department of Game v. Puyallup
Tribe (Puyallup II), 71 the United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that unfair discrimination existed in the prohibition
because "all Indian net fishing is barred and only hook-and-line
fishing entirely pre-empted by non-Indians is allowed.
' 77
The Supreme Court then'proposed that a formula was needed
to apportion between the treaty and nontreaty fishermen the
number of fish that could be caught. The Court stated:
At issue presently is the problem of accommodating net fishing
by the Puyallups. with conservation needs of the river. . . . If
hook-and-line fishermen now catch all the steel-head which can
be caught within the limits needed for escapement, then that
number must in some manner be fairly apportioned between
Indian net fishing and non-Indian sports fishing. . . . What
formula should be employed is not for us to propose .... The
aim is to accommodate the rights of Indians under the Treaty
and the rights of other people. 78
73. Id. at 398.
74. Id. at 399.
75. See, e.g., 443 U.S. at 674. Opponents, on the other hand, argue that equal pro-
tection mandates only an equal opportunity to fish, and nothing more. See, e.g.,
Washington State Comm'l Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 89 Wash. 2d 276,
285-86, 571 P.2d 1373 (1977).
76. 414 U.S. 44 (1973).
77. Id. at 48.
78. Id. at 48-49.
1980]
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The Supreme Court again remanded the case to the state courts,
this time to determine the exact formula that would "fairly ap-
portion" the steelhead run between the hook-and-line sports
fishing and the Puyallups' net fishing."1
4. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game (Puyallup III)
In Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game (Puyallup
I1), s° the Supreme Court upheld an order allowing 45 percent of
the natural" steelhead run to be taken by the Puyallup Indians
through commercial net fishing.12 The majority recognized that
the treaties secured to the Indians more than merely a right to
compete with nontreaty fishermen on an individual basis.
However, the case made it clear that treaty Indians could not rely
on their treaty rights to exclude other citizens from receiving a
fair apportionment. Not only were the tribes restricted to a
specified percentage of steelhead taken off their reservations, but
also the tribes could not claim an exclusive right to take steelhead
passing through their reservations.8 3
II. Instant Case
In Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Assoc.,8" the Supreme Court's assignment was to
interpret with greater accuracy the important treaty provisions
securing off-reservation fishing rights to the treaty Indians,
thereby resolving the conflict between state and federal courts
regarding what rights, if any, the Indians have to a share of the
anadromous fish in Washington state. Indeed, the Court's
responsibility was to resolve "[o]ne of the most significant state-
federal conflicts since the Civil War. .. ."" The Ninth Circuit
claimed that this conflict involved, next to some desegregation
cases, "the most concerted official and private efforts to frustrate
79. Id. at 49.
80. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
81. The hatchery steelhead runs, which were reared by the state at the expense of
licensed fishermen, apparently were not affected by the Court's decision.
82. "Under Washington state law steelhead are a game (noncommercial) fish which
can be taken only by hook and line. Since Indians traditionally fish only with nets, an ac-
commodation was necessary in the Puyallup . . . cases to permit Indians to fish for
steelhead with nets ... ." Petitioners' Reply Brief for certiorari, Puget Sound Gillnetters
Ass'n, at 7.
83. 433 U.S. 165, 177 (1977).
84. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).




a decree of a federal court witnessed in this century. '" 6 Because
of the widespread defiance of the district court's orders and the
unusual significance of the treaty fishing rights issue in the
Pacific Northwest, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
state and federal cases87 and set out to decide the proper inter-
pretation of the pertinent treaty language.88
The Court looked to the historical setting of the treaty negotia-
tions as an aid in discovering the original intent of the parties to
the treaties.8 9 The majority summarily rejected the equal oppor-
tunity theory proposed by the state,90 reasoning that the idea that
each individual Indian would share an "equal opportunity"
with thousands of newly arrived individual settlers is totally
foreign to the spirit of the negotiations. Such a "right," along
with the $207,500 paid the Indians, would hardly have been
sufficient to compensate them for the millions of acres they
ceded to the Territory.9'
Instead, the Court adopted an "equitable measure" of allocating
the anadromous fish resource between treaty and nontreaty
fishermen. 92 The majority first determined that under the "in com-
mon with" language of the treaties the Indians are entitled to take
up to 50 percent of the harvestable runs passing through their usual
and accustomed fishing grounds.93 This 50 percent allocation,
however, was meant as a maximum, not as a minimum figure.9 4
86. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States District Court, 573 F.2d 1123,
1126 (9th Cir. 1978).
87. 443 U.S. 658, 674 (1979).
88. The Court noted that an earlier denial of certiorari on the treaty interpretation
issue, Washington v. United States, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976), did not render the issue finally
adjudicated. The earlier denial came at an interlocutory stage in the proceedings; the
district court had retained continuing enforcement jurisdiction over the case. Subsequent
developments convinced the Court to grant certiorari in the instant case. See 443 U.S. at
672 n.19.
89. See 443 U.S. at 662-69, 676-77. The court adopted many of the findings of the
district court. The district court used extensively the testimony and reports of two well-
known anthropologists, who analyzed documents describing the setting and negotiations
of the treaties. The anthropologists' testimonies occupied five days of trial and required
some 900 pages of transcript in the record. See Brief for Respondents, Indian Tribes, at
10, id.
90. Id. at 676.
91. Id.
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The treaty share to the Indians may be reduced if tribal needs can
be satisfied by a lesser amount." The reduced allotment must
assure that the tribes' "reasonable livelihood needs" will be
met.96 With this and some additional modifications,97 the
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's interpretation of the
treaties.
Dealing with the Washington Supreme Court's refusal to com-
ply with the federal district court's orders, the Supreme Court
held that "[s]tate-law prohibition against compliance with the
District Court's decree cannot survive the command of the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution." 98 The
Washington Supreme Court decisions99 were vacated and the
district court's order that the state's Fisheries Department
prepare regulations protecting the tribal treaty fishing rights was
upheld.10o
Justice Powell, writing for the dissent,' 0' argued that the perti-
nent treaty language secured to the tribes merely a right of access
to their usual and accustomed fishing sites, and not a right to an
allotted percentage of the harvestable fish.'02 He predicted that
the majority's allocation of the fishery resource to the tribes
would (1) provide them with "an extraordinary economic wind-
fall," 0 3 (2) would be difficult to enforce,'0 4 (3) would unfairly
discriminate against non-Indian fishermen,'0 5 and (4) would
"reform a bargain struck more than one hundred years ago. ' 'lOS
95. Id. at 684-85.
96. Id. at 685.
97. The Court disagreed with the district court's exemption of all on-reservation
catches and off-reservation catches for ceremonial and subsistence needs; accordingly, the
district court's decree was modified to include these catches as part of the tribes' alloca-
tion. Id. at 685-86. This modification was not insubstantial, in light of the fact that the
treaty Indians harvested over 52,000 salmon in 1978 for ceremonial and subsistence pur-
poses. See Reply Brief for Petitioners, Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n, at 2-3 n.1, id.
98. Id. at 695.
99. Washington State Comm'] Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 89
Wash. 2d 276, 571 P.2d 1373 (1977); Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wash.
2d 677, 565 P.2d 1151 (1977).
100. 443 U.S. at 696.
101. The dissenting justices were Justices Powell, Stewart, and Rehnquist. Id.
102. Id. at 697 (Powell, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 705-706.
104. Id. at 706 n.9.
105. Id. at 706.





A. Judicial Rules for Interpreting Treaty Provisions
During the past 150 years, the Supreme Court has adopted
several rules of construction for interpreting treaties with the In-
dians. The primary policy behind these rules recognizes the une-
qual bargaining position of the tribes and their trust relationship
with the government. 7 Two of the most frequently cited rules
for interpreting treaty provisions are (1) the treaties must be con-
strued as they most likely were understood by the Indians, and
not according to the technical meaning ascribed by lawyers;'0 8
and (2) ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the Indians.'0 9
Balanced against the above two rules are additional canons
which assure that the intent of the treaty parties will be honored:
(1) treaties must be read in light of the common notions of the
day and the assumptions of those who drafted them;"' (2) the
obvious meaning of the words used in treaties must not be
disregarded by the courts;' and (3) treaties must be interpreted
and applied in a manner that implements their objectives." 2
In the past, the Supreme Court generally has exercised judicial
constraint by stopping short of varying the terms of a treaty to
meet alleged injustices.' ' 3 Injustices, unforeseen contingencies,
and the like have usually been left to the Congress to remedy.1'
107. See generally Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abroga-
tion: "As Long as Water Flows or Grass Grows upon the Earth"--How Long a Time is
That? 63 CALIF. L. REv. 601 (1975).
108. See Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); Choctaw
Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423 (1943); United States v. Shoshone Tribe
of Indians, 304 U.S. 111 (1938); Marlin v. Lewallen, 276 U.S. 58 (1928); Jones v.
Mechan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899).
109. See McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Choctaw Nation
v. Oklahoma, 398 U.S. 945 (1970); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956); Carpenter v.
Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
110. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206 (1978).
111. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975); Confederated
Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 330 U.S. 169 (1947); Choctaw Nation of Indians
v. United States, 318 U.S. 423 (1943); United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494
(1900); Best v. Polk, 85 U.S. 112 (1873).
112. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
113. "[E]ven Indian treaties cannot be rewritten or expanded beyond their clear terms
to remedy a claimed injustice or to achieve the asserted understanding of the parties."
Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943).
114. "We stop short of varying [a treaty's] terms to meet alleged injustices. Such
generosity, if any may be called for in the relations between the United States and the In-
1980]
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B. Impact of an Unforeseen Contingency on Court's Treaty In-
terpretation
1. Creation of a New Canon of Construction?
When the 1854 and 1855 treaties were negotiated, there was no
foresight of the need for future regulation of the fish resource.
The parties simply did not contemplate that the then abundant
resource would ever become scarce." ,5 Consequently, neither the
Indians nor the United States intended that their agreements
would determine whether, and if so how, a resource always
though to be inexhaustible would be allocated between treaty and
nontreaty fishermen. II6 The increasing demand on a limited 'fish
supply was a contingency unforeseen by the parties to the treaty.
On the other hand, the contingency of the future private
ownership of the lands in Washington Territory was foreseen and
provided for in the treaties. As recognized in United States v.
Winans,117 the tribes reserved the right to cross these private
lands and occupy them to the extent and for the purpose men-
tioned in the treaties. The Supreme Court in the instant case con-
ceded that the written and oral representations made contem-
poraneous to the signing of the treaties were primarily to assure
the tribes that access to their fishing sites would not be
impaired. 18 Indeed, the Court called the pertinent treaty
language a "specific provision for access." 119
dians, is for Congress." Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324
U.S. 335, 353 (1945) (footnote omitted).
115. See 443 U.S. at 675; id. at 698 (Powell, J., dissenting); Brief for Respondents,
Yakima Nation, at 27-28, id. at 658.
116. See id. at 675.
117. See notes 56-69 and accompanying text supra.
118. See443 U.S. at 675.
119. Id. There is additional evidence in the language of the treaties themselves, which
points to "right of access" as the proper interpretation of the tribes' treaty fishing rights.
A paragraph in the Treaty with the Yakimas, 12 Stat. 951 (1855), reads that the tribe has
"the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public
highways." Under an "equal share" construction of the "in common with" language,
the Yakima Nation is entitled to exclude nontreaty citizens from using up to one-half of
the public highways in the state. See Brief for Petitioners, Washington State, at 55; Peti-
tioners' Reply Brief for Certiorari, Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n, at 8. See also 443 U.S.
658 (1979).
The treaty language also makes it clear that the Indians reserved an exclusive right of
taking fish on their reservations, and only a right in common with other citizens to fish at
their traditional fishing places off their reservations. If the Court's interpretation of the
off-reservation "in common with" language is correct that it secured to the Indians ap-
proximately an equal share of the fishery resource, then the consistent outcome would be
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol8/iss1/7
NOTES
Although the Court viewed the treaties as arm's-length con-
tracts between two sovereign nations,'2 the original intention of
the parties did not rule that treaties' construction; instead, the
Court took the liberty to modify the treaties in today's modern
setting. By so doing, the Court implicitly recognized a new canon
of treaty construction-inequities imposed by an unforeseen con-
tingency should be alleviated by adjustment, accommodation,
and equitable apportionment of the original treaty rights.' 2'
2. The Court's "Equitable Measure" of the Tribes' Treaty
Share
The United States in its brief was willing to compromise the
tribes' treaty share of the harvestable fish in Washington state.
The government reasoned that "it is unnecessary to allocate a
portion of the fishery in excess of" the reasonable needs of the
treaty tribes. 122 The Court used this concession as a springboard
for introducing its modifiable allocation doctrine, a doctrine the
Court admitted "is not mandated by our prior cases." '123
The majority first determined that the treaty language secured
to the Indians an equal share of the harvestable fisheries, which
translates into a 50 percent allocation.' 24 It next decided that an
"equitable measure" of the tribes' present treaty right requires an
adjustment downward, if the reasonable livelihood needs of the
tribes can be met by a lesser amount.'23 In other words, the Court
delegated to itself and to the district court or special master the
responsibility to abrogate that portion of the tribes' predetermined
that the tribes' on-reservation fishing rights would involve an entitlement to all the fish
caught on the reservations. The Court ruled, however, that the Indians' reservation catch
is to be counted against their 50 percent allocation of the resource. See note 97 supra. The
more consistent conclusion would have been to recognize the treaties secured exclusive ac-
cess to fishing places on the reservation, and common access to fishing sites off the reser-
vation. See 443 U.S. at 697, 698 (Powell, J., dissenting).
120. 443 U.S. at .675.
121. Some may view this rule as nothing more than an application of the Winters doc-
trine to the treaty fishing rights context; i.e., the Supreme Court is simply holding that
implicit in Indian treaties is the reservation of sufficient fish to fulfill the reasonable needs
of the Indians. Cf. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (treaties implicitly
reserve sufficient waters to the tribes to fulfill the purposes of the reservations); See
generally Pelcyger, The Winters Doctrine and the Greening of the Reservations, 4 J. CON-
TEMP. L. 19 (1977).
122. Brief for Respondents, United States, at 70, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
123. 443 U.S. at 685.
124. Id. at 685, 686.
125. Id. at 685.
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treaty rights which, in the judgment of the judiciary, is unnecessary
to provide a "moderate living" for the Indians.' 26
The Supreme Court's new doctrine seems equitable-
something the parties can "live with"-and may be a reasonable
solution to a troubling controversy. The Supreme Court's accom-
modating interpretation of the tribes' controversial fishing rights
may be viewed, at least in part, as an attempt to quell a stormy
political issue. The decision represents a shift from the Winans
view of the treaties as granting merely a right of access,' 27 and the
culmination of a view, first expressed in Puyallup 11,128 that some
adjustment should be made on policy grounds to accommodate
the interests of all parties to a treaty controversy.
The Court's accommodating interpretation of the treaties can
be justified in light of the Winans doctrine, which considered the
1854 and 1855 treaties as "not a grant of rights to the Indians,
but a grant of rights from them-a reservation of those not
granted."' 29 To the extent that the tribes refrained from ceding
their fishing rights, the rights were retained. The Winans doc-
trine, therefore, seems to recognize that the tribes reserved,
beyond the mere right of access, a right to a sufficient share of
the harvestable fish to meet their reasonable needs.' 0 Hence,
when the resource became no longer limitless, the Court's
equitable apportionment became justified.
C. Modifiable Allocation Doctrine: Product of an Activist
Judiciary?
1. Enforcement and Management "'Nightmare"
During the past several years of litigation, the federal judiciary
has unfortunately been thrust into the management of the
fisheries industry of the Pacific Northwest. This is an area of
responsibility with which it is admittedly inexperienced.', The
federal district court judge has been hung in effigy, pegged for
impeachment, his life threatened, and otherwise been ostracized
for becoming the "fishmaster" of the Pacific Northwest.'
126. Id. at 685-86.
127. See notes 56-69 and accompanying text supra.
128. See notes 76-79 and accompanying text supra
129. 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
130. See 443 U.S. 657, 676-77 (1979).
131. See Brief for Respondents, United States, at 80. Id. at 658.
132. See Brief for Petitioners, Washington State, at 25; Petitioners' Brief for Cer-




Criticism also exists against federal law enforcement personnel,
who have been marshalled into Washington state to take over
what is basically a local law enforcement problem.'33
Some persons blame this enforcement and management
nightmare'34 partly on "judicial activism."' 3 5 The instant case
may be criticized as an example of the Court exercising
prerogatives of treaty adjustment and accommodation that have
been specifically reserved for Congress.' 36 A practical look at the
circumstances surrounding this controversy, however, indicates
that the Court really had no choice but to assure an active
posture in resolving the instant case.
2. Justification for the Supreme Court's Active Posture
Congressional inactivity, a litigious society, recalcitrant state
and local officials, together with a controversy of dangerous pro-
portions, provide justification for the Supreme Court's apparent
overstepping into a legislative role to determine tribal treaty
rights. The Court should not bear the blame for assuring an ac-
tive posture when both the citizens of a state and the federal
government look to it for resolution of a controversy. The parties
to the instant case assumed the conflict could be resolved only by
the United States Supreme Court. 37 Even the Congress looked to
the Supreme Court and encouraged it to make an "authoritative
resolution."' 31
If the Supreme Court had refused to make some effort at ac-
commodating the needs of the parties, the fishery controversy
might have been disastrous. Both treaty and nontreaty fishermen
had predicted that, without judicial assistance, an entire industry
133. See Brief for Respondents, United States, at 20. Id.
134. See Brief for Petitioners, Washington State, at 114; Petitioners, Brief for Cer-
tiorari, Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n, at 25. Id.
135. See generally TIME, Jan. 22, 1979, at 91.
136. "The federal courts below have shut their eyes to what the text of the Stevens
treaties, the history of their negotiations, constitutional considerations, and simply com-
mon sense all show. If they have done so in an effort to remedy some perceived injustice
to the Indians, they have exceeded the limited role assigned to the judiciary." Brief for
Petitioners, Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n, at 34. 443 U.S. 657, 658 (1979).
137. See Brief for Respondents, United States, at 59; Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari,
Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n, at 30. Id.
138. On Feb. 11, 1977, a Washington congressional delegation sent a letter to the
United States Attorney General, urging that "authoritative resolution by the Supreme
Court would benefit all parties." See Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari, Washington State,
at 11. Id.
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and resource could come to a quick demise.'39 Frustrations and
impatience led to the destruction of property, gunpoint confron-
tations, and near loss of life.' 0 One state court judge com-
mented, "I do not exaggerate when I say that all too frequently
lives and property rights have already hung in the balance."' ' 4'
The reluctance of state and local officials to comply with the
decrees of a federal district court only increased federal judicial
activity. As one court of appeals judge commented:
I deplore situations that make it necessary for us to become en-
during managers of the fisheries, forests, and highways, to say
nothing of school districts, police departments and so on. The
record in this case ... makes it crystal clear that it has been the
recalcitrance of Washington state officials (and their vocal
non-Indian commercial and sports fishing allies) which pro-
duced the denial of Indian rights requiring intervention by the
District Court. This responsibility should neither escape notice
nor be forgotten.' 4
2
Finally, in resolving the instant case, the judiciary may have
been justified to assume an active posture because it is the most
competent forum for devising solutions to controversies of this
kind and magnitude.'4 3 In addition, the judiciary may be the
most available forum under the circumstances of this case. As
one commentator said, "To refer Indians to Congress for a
legislative definition of the extent to which the state must satisfy
Indian economic need would be unfair and impractical.... Con-
gress is too busy to resolve every dispute over resources in a
federal system." 1 44 The instant case provides an example of a
commendable and relatively prompt attempt to determine what
rights belong to the treaty tribes of the Pacific Northwest.
139. As one party put it, "If respect for the law is not soon restored, there will even-
tually be no salmon left for the litigants in these cases to fight over." Id., Respondent's
Brief in Opposition of Certiorari, United States, at 20. See also Petitioners' Brief for Cer-
tiorari, Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n, at 24, 30. Id.
140. See Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari, Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n, at 26. Id.
141. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wash. 2d 677, 698, 565 P.2d 1151
(1977) (Stafford, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
142. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 693 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1086 (1976) (Burns, J., concurring).
143. See generally Comment, State Power and the Indian Treaty Right to Fish, 59
CALIF. L. REv. 485 (1971).





In the instant case, the Supreme Court interpreted treaty
fishing rights in a way that could meet the needs of the modern
fishermen of the Pacific Northwest. The case provides an exam-
ple of the judiciary exercising powers normally reserved to the
legislative branch of government. Such role changing may have
been justified in light of the seriousness of the controversy and
the need for prompt resolution. The decision was necessary to
resolve a disturbing state-federal conflict of potentially disastrous
dimensions.
It would be naive to assume that the instant case represents the
end of the fishing rights controversy in the Pacific Northwest.
"In an area so politically charged-involving the role of powerful
state and federal agencies, sophisticated conservation programs,
and major commercial industries-litigation cannot be a final
answer." 145 Congress may yet be called upon to make the final
determination of the extent of the modern treaty fishing rights of
the Pacific Northwest Indians. 41 Until then, the highest court of
the land has provided the most authoritative answer to date.
145. D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT, C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 626 (1979).
146. Tens of thousands of signatures have been gathered on petitions to Congress for
abrogation of Indian treaties. It may be that the Court's liberal construction of the
treaties in the instant case will lead ultimately to a legislative "backlash" in the form of
treaty abrogation or forced legislative settlement. See id. at 627.
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